Politics, Catechism, and Pirates

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TODO: incomplete; need to add conclusion.

A lot of political theory is based on the idea of the coercive power of the state. Specifically, the idea of the state as the "legitimate repository of coercive power"; e.g., policing powers. I believe this is a false conception.

The argument goes something like this: A) there are behaviors that are individually profitable, but represent a net-loss to society, B) in some cases, it is only the threat or exercise of force which prevents individuals from engaging in these actions, therefore C) it is necessary to invest an organ of society with the power to exercise said force. Though the nature of the state and the policing organization vary, the idea of investiture and policing powers are considered to be more or less constant features.

I believe that this is a true argument. Meaning, it describes something fundamental about the way society works. The explicit threat of incarceration and risk of death prevents some burglary.^{[notes 1]} During a burglary, I myself am invested with policing powers in order to prevent theft in-so-far as I may legitimately use force to stop an individual who threatens my life or property. After the burglary, I rely on professional police to find my stuff, but more importantly, society relies on the police to capture the burglar and aggregate theft.^{[notes 2]}

The problem with the accepted wisdom on the matter is the idea that force ever need be coercive. In his book, The Invisible Hook, Peter Leeson describes the ship articles to which pirates would bind themselves, creating floating societies. He makes the argument that although these articles allowed (and required) force to be used as part of punishment and keeping order within the society of pirates, the force was not coercive.

The difference was that pirates (mostly) willingly joined agreed to be bound by the articles. Thus, the lashing one receives after one stole a mate's booty wasn't coercive because it had been agreed to prior to the act of theft. The lashing is nothing more than the execution of a contract clause to which the thief willing bound himself.

In discussing this book, Russ Roberts remarks that the idea of a "social contract" is intimately tied with this idea of coercion. It is true that fundamentally, the social contract is imposed. The imposition flies in the face of the general theory of contracts leading one to wonder whether "social contract" as a contract at all. Perhaps the better term would be "benign tyranny".^{[notes 3]}

Notes

1. ↑ The explicit "threat" aspect is legitimate, but overplayed in modern politics. I mean this in two ways. First, the threat need not be explicit. Taboo, shunning, the loss of love, etc. exist as an implicit and powerful bar to bad behavior without the need for explicit prescriptive punishment. Second, there is, at least functionally, something like conscious that seems to guide our actions. Adam Smith's "man in the breast".
2. ↑ Recovering items from any particular crime is less critical in modern society due to insurance.
3. ↑ Some would argue that the tyranny is not so benign, but I think it fair that even if a social contract is a actually nothing of the sort, that thing which we refer to as such is generally of a positive nature. It is hyperbolic to lump democracy, even if imposed on societies members, in the same category as Uganda under Idi Amin.